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Foreign policy analysis is defined as an evaluation of
the benefits and costs of alternative collections of overseas
activities, considering the relationship of their consequences
to foreign policy goals and interests. The need for a quan-
titative methodology to supplement traditional methods of
policy analysis is discussed. A quantitative policy analysis
methodology is developed which consists of: a predictive
model that forecasts objectively-verifiable consequences of
the proposed activities; and a weighted additive value func-
tion defined over consequences that measures the effective-
ness of each alternative. The value function reflects the
extent to which desired consequences are achieved by a given
alternative and the relationship of desired consequences to
motivating goals and interests. The problem of selecting an
optimal allocation of resources and preferred mix of diplomatic
activities is formulated as an integer program and a se-
quential algorithm is developed for its solution. Extensions
to a dynamic, multi-year planning model and modifications to
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"We do ill to exalt the powers of the human mind,




A. POLICY ANALYSIS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The foreign affairs of the United States consist of a
wide variety of policies, programs, and actions scattered
throughout the world and conducted by many government agencies
in the pursuit of numerous and often conflicting aims. Char-
acteristic activities include bilateral economic and military
assistance programs, cultural exchange programs, the informing
activities of the United States Information Agency, agricul-
tural assistance programs of the Department of Agriculture,
contributions to multilateral aid programs, and diplomatic
representation to governments of host countries and within
international forums. In addition to his role as advisor to
the President on foreign policy matters, the Secretary of
State is charged with the responsibility, "to the full ex-
tent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination
and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United
States Government overseas." One indispensable tool upon
which the Secretary must rely for assistance in both of
these roles is the policy analysis process at the Department
of State.
1. Foreign Affairs Manual Circular No. 385, based on
National Security Action Memorandum 341.

While diplomacy is still very much an art, the need for
a more rational process to establish the broad outlines of
policy and motivate the allocation of scarce resources has
been recognized by many both within and without the Foreign
Service. A recent State Department management reform task
force declared in its report: "Underlying all our other
considerations is the principal recommendation that the
Department devise and base its activities on a system which
identifies U.S. interests, estimates foreign interests and
environmental trends, matches U.S. strategies to the identi-
fied threats to the preservation of U.S. interests, and op-
portunities for their advancement, and selects and costs
2preferred and alternative objectives and courses of action."
In an introduction to a study of Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting systems conducted by his Senate subcommittee
Senator Henry Jackson stated, "Nowhere is the need for




Several attempts to improve the foreign policy analysis
process have been made in the past decade. In 1965-66 the
State Department experimented with a Comprehensive Country
Programming System (CCPS) . The system consisted primarily of
a detailed breakdown of proposed expenditures into national
2. "Diplomacy for the 70' s: A Program of Management Reform
for the Department of State, " (Washington: USGPO) December
1970.
3. Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International
Operations, committee print, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting:
Interim Observations," 2 December 1968.

I. INTRODUCTION
A. POLICY ANALYSIS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The foreign affairs of the United States consist of a
wide variety of policies, programs, and actions scattered
throughout the world and conducted by many government agencies
in the pursuit of numerous and often conflicting aims. Char-
acteristic activities include bilateral economic and military
assistance programs, cultural exchange programs, the informing
activities of the United States Information Agency, agricul-
tural assistance programs of the Department of Agriculture,
contributions to multilateral aid programs, and diplomatic
representation to governments of host countries and within
international forums. In addition to his role as advisor to
the President on foreign policy matters, the Secretary of
State is charged with the responsibility, "to the full ex-
tent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination
and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United
States Government overseas." One indispensable tool upon
which the Secretary must rely for assistance in both of
these roles is the policy analysis process at the Department
of State.
1. Foreign Affairs Manual Circular No. 385, based on
National Security Action Memorandum 341.

interest and objectives categories, rather than by traditional
budgetary categories. An engaging account of the birth and
demise of CCPS and its short-lived successor, the Foreign Af-
fairs Programming- System (TAP C ) , may be found in Mosher and
Harr [19]. A more recent work containing an examination of two
policy analysis systems currently in use - the Country Analysis
and Strategy Paper (CASP) and the Policy Analysis and Re-
source Allocation (PARA) system - is Reference [29] . CASP
incorporates a formalized logic flow for policy analysis,
based upon perceived conflicts between environmental conditions
in each country and a generic list of U.S. interests. PARA
is at present a heterogeneous collection of methodologies
adopted by the regional bureaus. In format and content most
of the PARAs (the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs excepted)
are essentially extended versions of the traditional State
Department policy paper. CASP serves as the PARA for the
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF PAST AND PRESENT POLICY ANALYSIS SYSTEMS
The foregoing attempts to rationalize policy analysis in
the State Department have met with limited success. CCPS and
FAPS were ultimately abolished. The PARA program has yet to
generate any significant departures from traditional methods
of policy analysis. While CASP is both operational and in-
novative by Department standards, it nevertheless relies
exclusively on qualitative analysis. The result is a docu-
ment which offers little improvement in analytical quality





From an analytical viewpoint, all of these endeavors have
suffered from three principal shortcomings. The first has
been the absence of a sound conceptual and analytical founda-
tion on which to build the methodology. Dror cites the
4
"absence of suitable goal taxonomies and value morphologies"
as a defect of a contemporary policy analysis. This is one
facet of the conceptual weakness of previous approaches. Not
only are the nature, content, and relationships among national
interests and goals unclear, but the manner in which they
should determine concrete objectives and policies is equally
vague. Such vagueness may sometimes be a virtue in winning
support for policies, but it has no place in a rational process
for formulating policies.
The second shortcoming of past and current efforts to
rationalize policy analysis is the failure or reluctance to
address the problem of estimating the effectiveness of policies
and programs. This shortcoming, which is closely related to
the first, has resulted in part from the scarcity of suitable
quantitative effectiveness measures and indicators in foreign
affairs, and partly from the need inherent in policy planning
to use effectiveness measures at a very high level of
aggregation. Physical measures of the second type are not
available in any decisionmaking context. Inability to esti-
mate the effectiveness of proposed alternatives is a fatal
defect in any policy planning and programming system, and is
4. Yehezkel Dror, Design for Policy Sciences
,
(New York,
American Elsevier Publishing Co.) 1971, p. 65.
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a major reason why Aaron Wildavsky was forced to conclude
that "no one knows how to do program budgeting."
Inability to handle the complexity intrinsic in foreign
policy analysis is the last major shortcoming of CCPS/FAPS,
CASP, and PARA.. As will be seen below, policy analysis re-
quires the evaluation of alternative vectors of activities
which, even when suboptimizing at relatively low levels of
aggregation, such as the country level, possess many
dimensions. Furthermore, activities and aims interact
within and across country boundaries in very complicated ways
that defy traditional methods of policy analysis.
The methodology proposed herein offers a way in which all
of the foregoing analytical difficulties might be alleviated.
It makes the foreign policy goal structure explicit. It
provides a way to relate concrete, measurable objectives and
activities to the broad policy goals and interests that
motivate them. Finally, it promises to help reduce the
problem of complexity by breaking multi-factor judgmental
tasks into smaller subtasks that can be more easily handled
by decisionmakers.
The basic approach taken in developing an explicit goal
structure is to clarify vague goals, such as "national
security" or "economic prosperity", by defining them in terms
of progressively lower order goals until measurable objectives
5. Aaron Wildavsky, "Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS",
in Haveman, Robert H., and Margolis, Julius, eds
.
, Public
Expenditures and Policy Analysis
,
(Chicago, Markham Publish-
ing Co. ) 1970, p. 467.
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are reached. The effectiveness measures developed are ad-
ditive functions of weighted, abstract "satisfaction levels"
of the objectives, with the weights assigned in a way that
reflects the relationship between each objective and the
broader motivating goals. This type of approach to policy
analysis has been utilized by several authors in other fields.
Chamberlain and Kingsland [5] used a goal-weighting method-
ology to compare alternative space programs on the basis of
their contribution to space exploration goals. S. H. Dole
and others in a Rand Corporation study [2 3] used a similar
methodology for the same purpose. Another Rand study [22]
established a hierarchical structure of attributes to eval-
uate the effectiveness of alternative transportation policies
for the Northeast Corridor.
The policy analysis methodology developed in this paper
is intended for use in the State Department's PARA program.
It is designed as an analytical tool to assist policymakers
in the discovery of sound strategies for the future. The
method offers a way to refine and focus the judgments of
those experienced in foreign affairs, thus incorporating in
policy analysis the unique capabilities of both human judgment





A decision that has broad or significant implications,
or which serves as a guide for further decisions. "Policy-
making is a species of decisionmaking."
2. Activity
A course of action, operation, task, or program.
Typical categories of foreign affairs activities are repre-
senting, informing, rendering economic assistance, and
resolving conflicts.
3. Consequence
An event which may result from the adoption of one
or more alternative activities, and whose occurrence or
nonoccurrence can be verified objectively. The collapse of
a particular government or a ten percent increase in the
number of miles of paved roads in a lesser-developed country





A desired consequence; an aim whose achievement can
be objectively verified. Foreign affairs objectives
7generally fall into one of the following categories:
6. Dror, Design for Policy Sciences
, p. 13.
7, This particular categorization of objectives was adapted
from a management chart developed by Professor Robert von




a. To achieve desired levels of performance or
behavior. (Example: to prevent one state from attacking
another)
.
b. To attain certain qualitative or quantitative
standards. (Example: to raise the level of nutrition in
a lesser-developed country)
.
c. To possess specific capabilities. (Example:
to be capable of defending an ally from a given threat)
.
5. Goal
An abstract aim or motivating desire which is not
itself operationally defined, but from which concrete objec-
tives and activities are derived. "Access to foreign
markets", "retention of key overseas bases", and "maintenance




A very broad, high order goal. "National security"
and "Economic prosperity" may be thought of as national
interests. No clear distinction between interests and goals
is intended. The term "interest" is included because of its
popularity in the policymaking community and among political
scientists, and the consequent need to clarify its relation-
ship to the concepts of goal and objective more familiar to
decision theorists.
A policy may be thought of as a decision to take certain
actions or to pursue certain aims. Thus the term "policy"
defined above will be used frequently in this paper, as it is
in the Foreign Service, to refer to both activities and the
objectives or goals which they pursue.
14

7 . Policy analysis
Evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative
collections of activities, considering the relationship of
their consequences to goals and interests, for the purpose of
identifying preferred policy structures. (A policy "structure"
is a collection or mix of activities and their associated
aims.) Yehezkel Dror [8] defines policy analysis as a
"prescriptive and heuristic aid for the identification of
p
preferred policy alternatives." He notes that policy analysis
includes innovation as well as evaluation of alternatives.
In this paper the alternative activities which may compose
a policy structure will be taken as given. Thus "policy
analysis" will be confined to the design and identification
of preferred mixes of activities. Policy analysis entails:
- Looking to the future.
- Examining alternatives in the light of their contribution
. to stated goals.
- Identifying preferred alternatives.
D. THE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPROACH
The policy analysis model developed in this paper is
based on the "systems analysis" approach. E. S. Quade defines
systems analysis as "a systematic approach to helping a
decisionmaker choose among courses of action by investigating
his full problem, searching out objectives and alternatives,
and comparing them in the light of their consequences; it
8. Dror, Design for Policy Sciences, p. 55.
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employs an appropriate framework - in so far as possible
analytic - to bring expert judgment and intuition to bear
9
on the problem." The elements of a systems analysis are:
- Statement of Objectives
- Specification of alternative means of achieving the
objectives
- Evaluation of the costs of each alternative
- Evaluation of the effectiveness of each alternative,
relative to the objectives, through the use of a
predictive model
- Ranking of the alternatives in order of preference
using a criterion that relates the various dimensions
of effectiveness and cost.
Most decisionmakers would agree that this is nothing more
than a common sense strategy for attacking a decision problem,
The methodology proposed in this paper will differ from many
traditional systems analyses, however, in that subjectively-
derived quantitative measures of effectiveness will be
utilized where physical performance measures are not avail-
able, and when it is desired to combine dissimilar physical
effectiveness measures.
The cost/benefit analytical approach employed in this
paper is not the only approach that could be taken to the
development of a prescriptive decision theory for foreign
affairs. The fact that foreign policy must be designed to
9. E. S. Quade, "Systems Analysis and Policy Planning," in
E. S. Quade and W. I. Boucher, eds
.
, Systems Analysis and





meet the challenges of a conflict environment might
suggest game theory as a potentially fruitful approach. It
is true that game theory can provide useful insights into
some aspects of foreign affairs. However, in assessing the
overall usefulness of the theory of games to a prescriptive
decision theory, Howard Raiffa concludes: "When we depart
from the extreme case in which there are two players with
strictly opposing interests, game theory has very little
advice to offer us." One characteristic of game theory
is that it attempts to prescribe optimal strategies for both
actors in a conflict situation. In contrast to this jointly-
prescriptive approach, the policy analysis methodology
proposed herein employs what Raiffa calls a "one-sided
prescriptive point of view." It prescribes preferred policy
decisions on the basis of a predictive model which depends in
part on the use of descriptive theories of what other actors
are likely to do.
Conflicts of interest are one salient feature of the
policymaking environment, and uncertainty is another. Con-
sequently the explicit treatment of uncertainty inherent in
traditional Bayesian decision theory might recommend this as
another possible approach to foreign policy analysis. Un-
fortunately, formal decision theory requires knowledge or
estimation of the probability distributions of the uncertain
10. Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis, (Reading, Mass
Addison-Wesley) 1970, p. 290.
13
-- Ibid ., p. 292.
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variables. Even the most devoted Bayesian would find this
requirement hard to meet in foreign affairs decisionmaking.
In addition, a formal treatment of uncertainty would add
another order of magnitude of computational complexity to
the model, thus making it extremely difficult for decision-
makers to understand. Finally, the assignment of an actual
probability distribution to many variables in foreign policy-
making would suggest a capability for precision that does not,
in fact, exist.
A more practical method of dealing with uncertainty in
foreign policy analysis is to perform sensitivity analyses
on the results of a deterministic model. Consequently that
is the approach taken in this paper. When the consequences
of an activity are uncertain, separate effectiveness compu-
tations are made for each possible consequence, or for a
few representative consequences. The selection of variables
and assignment of values for sensitivity testing should be
based on the knowledge and judgment of experienced policy-
makers, whose intuition can often suggest which variables
are crucial and what their values are likely to be. In
addition, due account should be given to the "robustness" of




II. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM
A. VERBAL FORMULATION
A policy analysis process may be idealized as follows:
(1) A period of time is defined during which activities
are to be pursued and their consequences realized. This is
called the "planning period." In the Department of State
PARA program, the planning period is the approaching fiscal
year.
(2) A set of consequences is formulated which policy-
. 12
makers desire to bring about or avoid during the planning
period. These desired consequences are called "objectives."
Examples are "to obtain the release of all U.S. prisoners
of war" and "to raise the literacy rate in country X by
five percent."
(3) A list is drawn up of all the activities under the
purview of the policymakers that would contribute to the
achievement of one or more objectives.
(4) Limitations on the amount of resources available
will ordinarily prevent the simultaneous pursuit of all
desired activities. Hence various combinations of the
activities on the list are examined in terms of their cost
12. The avoidance of an event is logically equivalent to
the bringing about of its complement. Hence all desired




and consequences. During this process the original lists of
desired consequences and feasible activities may be revised.
Eventually a collection of activities is selected which ap-
pears to promise the most desirable set of consequences that
can be obtained within resource constraints.
B. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
The preceding description of a policy analysis process
will now be transformed into a more precise mathematical
formulation.
1. Consequences
Each objective defines a distinct category or dimen-
sion along which similar (but less or more desirable) con-
sequences can be imagined. An objective is the most attractive
consequence in a given dimension that is considered politically
and technologically feasible. Each consequence dimension is
denoted by an integer j = l,...,m , where m is the total
number of dimensions (which equals the total number of
objectives)
.
Within a given dimension j, a particular consequence
is denoted by the variable q . . Each value of q . represents
a consequence somehow distinct from other consequences along
that dimension. For instance, let j = "literacy rate among
citizens of country X." Then q. might take on values between
50 and 70 percent. When a consequence can be measured quan-
titatively, the units of q. are always the physical units in
which the consequence is measured (e.g., "dollars" for GNP,
"dollars per person" for per-capita income) . Qualitative
20

consequences (e.g., the occurrence or non-occurrence of an
event) are represented arbitrarily by integers. Thus if
j = "Egyptian reaction to UN cease-fire proposal, " one pos-
sible formulation would be: q . = 1 if Egyptians accept the
proposal, q . = if they reject it. The variable q. must
take on at least two values for every j
.
The objective in each consequence dimension j is the
most desirable value of q
.
, called q., , , that is consideredn
3 ^jbest
feasible . Similarly, for each j the least desirable value of
q. that is considered acceptable, called q. ^ is also
^j - ^jworst
identified. This value serves two purposes: first, it pro-
vides for the automatic elimination from further consideration
of any proposed activity whose predicted consequence in dimen-
sion j is less desirable than q. , ; second, it is usedJ
^jworst
with q., in constructing a relative value function over
consequences (see Chapter IV)
.
An outcome , denoted q, is a vector of consequences.
It is defined by specifying the value of q . for every j
.
Thus,
q = (q.^ . . . ,qm )





Each different type of activity on the list of all
contemplated activities is denoted by an integer i = l,...,n,
where n is the number of different activity types. (Student
exchange programs and balance-of-payments loans are examples
of two different activity types.) With each activity i a
21

variable a., called the level of operation of activity i,
is associated. When an activity can be described in terms of
physical input or output measures, the activity level is
expressed in whatever physical units seem most appropriate
for describing the scale on which the activity is "operated"
(e.g., number of students exchanged, or size of loan in 1972
U.S. dollars). Qualitative activity levels (for example, to
take or not to take a certain action) are represented arbi-
tratily by integers. To illustrate, if activity i is "mining
of Haiphong", then one possible formulation would be: a. = 1
represents the action "mine the harbor"; a. = represents
the action "do not mine the harbor." (Transformations such
as this from an event space to a number space are made solely
for the purpose of notational convenience.) The variable a.
must take on at least two values for every i.
An alternative , denoted a, is defined by specifying
the level of operation of each of the n activities. An
alternative is a vector of activity levels. Thus,
a — (a, , . . . , a )
3. The Problem
The task of policy analysis is to find an alternative
a which leads to the most desirable outcome q that can be
obtained without violating any constraints. Limited resources
and political considerations will likely prohibit the simul-
taneous realization of the most desired consequence in each
dimension. This necessitates the making of value tradeoffs
(considerations of relative value) among consequences as well
as the prediction of consequences from activities. Policy
22

analysis may thus be dichotomized as follows:
(1) What outcome will result from each feasible
alternative?
(2) Which of these outcomes is most desirable?
The approach taken in this paper in answering the






The outcome q of each a is given by a predictive
model F. A separate model predicts the cost of each a.
The value of each q, relative to all other outcomes, is
given by an evaluative model U. It is then possible to
identify the alternative which leads to the greatest value of
U(q) without exceeding resource constraints.
The problem of predicting outcomes will be addressed
in the following chapter. Evaluation of outcomes will be
treated in Chapter IV. Then Chapter V will integrate these
results in a quantitative policy analysis methodology.
23

III. PREDICTING THE CONSEQUENCES AND COSTS OF ACTIVITIES
The preceding section distinguished between two phases of
policy analysis: predicting the consequences of proposed
activities, and evaluating the relative desirability of con-
sequences. The evaluative phase will be further treated in
Chapter IV. This chapter addresses the problem of predicting
the consequences of activities or, conversely, estimating
what activities will produce a desired set of consequences.
In the notation adopted in the last chapter, F is the function
that predicts the outcome q of any alternative a. In this
chapter some observations on the general nature and sources
of F will be made.
A. THE OBJECTIVITY OF A PREDICTIVE MODEL
First it should be observed that F is a representation
of reality. It assumes the existence of certain relation-
ships among real-world phenomena (activities and consequences)
.
Hence the accuracy of F as a predictor can, at least in theory,
be verified objectively by impartial scientific inquiry.
This objective property of F distinguishes it from the eval-
uative model U which will be derived in the next chapter.
The latter necessarily embodies value judgments concerning
the relative desirability of consequences. While F models





B. THE INVERSE OF A PREDICTIVE MODEL
It will be helpful to distinguish between F and its in-
verse, denoted F If a policymaker wishes to predict the
consequences of a given alternative a, he must use F to obtain
q = F(a). Conversely, if he wishes to determine what activities
should be chosen to obtain a given desired outcome, he must
know F to find a = F (q) . The model F is assumed to be a
13
"function" in the precise mathematical sense of this term.
Thus F associates with each alternative a unique outcome.
14 . -1However, unless F is a "one-to-one" function, F will not
itself be a function. When this is true, two or more alter-
natives may be associated with the same outcome. This should
cause no difficulty, however. Since the effectiveness of an
alternative will be measured (see Chapter IV) in terms of
the value of its consequences, two alternatives with the
same q should be equally attractive in terms of effectiveness.
C. SELECTING A PREDICTIVE MODEL
The particular F most appropriate for predicting the
outcome of a given set of activities depends upon the nature
of the activities. For example, various economic models are
available for estimating the impact on a country's economy
of economic assistance programs. Military combat models can
13. A function is a set of ordered pairs (x,y) such that
each x is paired with o_ne and only one y. The ordered pairs
of F are of the form (a,q)
.
14. A one-to-one function is a set of ordered pairs (x,y)
such that each x is paired with one and only one y, and
furthermore each y is paired with one and only one x.
25

be used to predict the consequences of maintaining various
force levels and structures. The effects of a certain
diplomatic action on the behavior of other states is best
predicted by experienced diplomats. Here the "model" is
contained implicitly in the diplomats' experience and judgment
In short, the predictive models used in policy analysis may
come from a wide variety of sources and take many different
forms.
Policy analysis often encompasses many different kinds
of activities. In such cases F may be constructed by com-
bining several sub-models. For instance, if the spectrum of
contemplated activities includes military and economic as-
sistance programs as well as diplomatic maneuvers, F might

























A problem which can be decomposed in this manner lends itself
to the technique of suboptimization. However, interactions
between the sub-models (for instance, military programs that




A special kind of consequence is the cost of an activity.
In this paper it is assumed that the cost of an activity is
the amount of money that it consumes. Thus the methodology
implicity assumes that the scarce resources relevant to the
problem can be converted to the common denominator of money.
Also assumed is the availability of a cost model, C, which
assigns a dollar cost, c = C(a), to each alternative a. While
the precise form of C varies with the activities being costed,
it is assumed in the next chapter to be a linear function.
27

IV. ASSESSING THE' RELATIVE VALUE OF OUTCOMES
In this chapter a method will be proposed for assessing
the relative value of each outcome q that would follow from
one or more of the alternatives under consideration.
"Relative value" is a quantification of the decisionmaker's
preference for an outcome, relative to all other outcomes
under consideration in a given analysis. The measure of
value used is an additive utility function defined over the
set of outcomes and constructed in a way that reflects:
(1) The extent to which each objective is satisfied in
a given outcome
(2) The relative importance of the objectives in con-
tributing to goals and interests
The evaluative model developed in this chapter is similar
to one employed by F. S. Pardee and others in evaluating the
effectiveness of transportation systems. The model may be
described in their words:
The procedure is quantitative throughout. However it
relies heavily upon subjective inputs from responsible
decisionmaking personnel. The major underlying thesis
is that assessment and final choice must depend upon
subjective evaluation, but that a systematic and quan-
titative, method of making such judgments proves quite
helpful.




Rand Corporation), Sept. 1969, p. 158.
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A. POLICY ANALYSIS AS AN EVALUATION OF MULTI-ATTRIBUTED
ALTERNATIVES
Charles Hitch and Roland McKean, in discussing the selec-
tion of effectiveness criteria for policy problems, observe:
Ideally we should choose that course of action which,
with available resources, maximizes something like the
"satisfaction" of an individual, the profits of a firm,
the "military worth" of the military establishment, or
the "well being" of a group.. Then we would pick the policy
that promised to yield the most satisfaction, the most
profits, the most military worth, or the most well being..,
We do not have the ability to translate outcomes into
such terms. In practical problem-solving, therefore, we
have to look at some "proximate" criterion which serves
to reflect what is happening to satisfaction or military
worth. Actual criteria are the practicable substitutes
for the maximization of whatever we would ultimately
like to maximize.
Unfortunately, such abstractions as "military worth" or
"national welfare" can be adequately described only by a
fairly large number of the actual or proximate criteria to
which Hitch and McKean refer. Furthermore these criteria
cannot generally be expressed on commensurable scales.
"National security", for example, might be defined in terms
of such quantities as the number of strategic missiles, army
divisions, and tactical air wings possessed by the U.S. and
her potential enemies. It is not possible, however, to
combine these criteria into a single physical measure of
military security. In short, policy analysis inevitably
necessitates evaluating the relative desirability of multi -
dimensional vectors of physical criteria.
16. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University
Press), 1961, pp. 160-161.
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The determination of preference between two multi-
dimensional outcomes is often a difficult matter even for an
experienced policymaker. In many cases this can present an
overwhelming task for unaided subjective judgment, unless some
grossly simplifying evaluative scheme is used, thereby risking
the neglect of important dimensions of the problem. Peter
Fishburn in Reference [11] makes the following observation
on this point:
A second practical limitation [to preference ordering a
set of consequences] . . . concerns an individual's
ability to state unambiguously his preference between
two consequences, each of which is composed of perhaps
20 or 30 values of relevant action and outcome variables
. . . Confronted by two such consequences, he may be
terribly confused in attempting to comprehend "simultaneously"
the consequences and may be reduced to-a shrug when requested
to express a preference between them.
Several evaluative schemes have been developed to assist
decision-makers in identifying preferences among multi-
attributed alternatives. A lexicographical ordering model
ranks the outcomes according to their value in the single
most important outcome dimension. If two or more outcomes
are equal in this dimension, the second most important dimen-
sion is used, and so forth. Herbert Simon [31] has suggested
a satisficing model which tells the decisionmaker to choose
the first outcome he finds each of whose component consequences
is at least as desirable as a minimum satisfactory standard
for that dimension. Finally, an additive utility model has
been suggested in various forms by many decision theorists.
17. Peter C. Fishburn, Decision and Value Theory
,
(New York:
Wiley), 1964, p. 87.
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(See, for example, Refs. [5], [11], [13], [33].) The additive
model evaluates each outcome by summing its scores, relative
to the other outcomes under consideration, in each dimension.
The lexicographical model is of limited value because in
most multi-factor decision problems no single factor can be
identified as of exclusive importance. Essentially this model
reduces the multi- factor problem to one dimension, with the
other dimensions taken into account only in case of a tie
between two or more outcomes in the primary dimension. On
the other hand, if a satisficing model is used and the first
acceptable alternative is selected, many more attractive
alternatives might be ignored. Satisficing can be helpful
in eliminating many alternatives that are unacceptable in one
or more dimensions. However, after all unacceptable alter-
natives have been identified, many choices may still remain.
The policymaker would still like to determine which of these
is most desirable. This can be accomplished using additive
utilities. Consequently, one possible strategy for choosing
among multi-attributed policy outcomes would be:
(1) Eliminate unacceptable alternatives using the
satisficing criterion.
(2) Identify the most preferred of the remaining alter-
natives using an additive utility function.
In Chapter II the minimum acceptable consequence in each
dimension, q. . , was defined. These values may be used
^jworst 2
in conjunction with the satisficing model to eliminate un-
acceptable outcomes from further consideration. An outcome
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a is unacceptable if q . is less preferred than q. for
** » •* f ^-j r ^jworst
at least one dimension j
.
In the following section an additive utility model for
evaluating the remaining outcomes will be developed.
B. THE ADDITIVE VALUE FUNCTION
The technique proposed herein for measuring the value of
alternative policy outcomes is an application of the theory
of additive utilities. The theory is used in a way that
explicates policymakers 1 intuitive feel for the relationship
between desired consequences and less well-defined goals.
The purpose of the additive value function is to collapse
multi-dimensional outcomes into a single dimension, thereby
facilitating preference comparisons.
The assumption that the utility or value of an outcome
is an additive function of the utilities of its components
is a common solution to the problem of evaluating multi-
attributed alternatives. For example, Efraim Turban and Morton
Metersky [33] used additive utilities to determine the ef-
fectiveness of a complex aircraft system with several measures
of performance. At a higher level of analysis, A. Myrick
Freeman [15] suggests the use of additive weighting functions
over multiple objectives for evaluating public expenditure
policies
.
An additive utility function takes the form:
U(q) = U
1 (q 1 ) + U 2 (q 2 ) + . . . + U^qJ (1)
->
where q = (q. , q„, . . . , q ) is a member of the set Q of feasible
outcomes; U(q) is a numerical function on Q which expresses
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the relative value of q; and U . (q . ) , j=l r 2, . . . ,m, is a
numerical function which expresses the relative value of
component consequence q .
.
If P("is preferred to") is a- preference relation on the
set Q of multi-attributed consequences, and if q and r are
two elements of Q, then the additive utility model provides:
5 P ?^01 {q1 ) + . . . + Um (qm)> Ul(ri ) + . . . + Um (rm ) (2)
The theory underlying an additive utility function is
that a preference ordering among the various alternative
vectors can be constructed from preference orderings on each
factor or dimension. The assumptions about P and Q that imply
(2) are given by Fishburn [13] . Most of them will not be
treated in detail here. However, the principal assumption
implicit in the additive utility approach is that the com-
ponents of each outcome are value-wise independent . In
Fishburn 's words:
In multiple-factor situations it often seems natural
to think in terms of a preference order for each factor
and then to wonder how these ought to be combined or
synthesized into an overall preference order. However,
this approach presupposes a certain kind of independence
among the factors, namely that the order for a given
factor is independent of the particular levels of the
other factors.
The assumption of factor independence requires that "the
evaluator be able to make consistent value judgments about
the levels of any one factor when the levels of all other
factors are held fixed, and his judgment must not depend on
18. Peter C. Fishburn, Utility Theory for Decision Making
,




the particular fixed levels of the other factors." This








1 ) <^ (c 2/ d2 ) P (c lf d 2 ) for every d , d2
and (c lf d2 ) P (c^d^^ (c 2 ,d2 ) P (c^d^ for every c^, c2
While these conditions are necessary to guarantee the existence
of an additive utility representation for the preference
20
relation, they are not sufficient. The reader is referred
to Fishburn [13] for a more rigorous treatment of additive
utilities. For the purposes of this paper an intuitive
grasp of the notion of factor independence will suffice.
It should quickly be pointed out that it will not always
be possible to define consequences on strictly orthogonal
dimensions. Hence the components of the outcome vector in a
policy analysis will often not be entirely value-wise inde-
pendent. However, all models are a simplification of reality,
and this one is no exception. The existence of some inter-
dependence among factors should not normally invalidate the
approach. This interdependence can be held to a minimum by
a judicious definition of consequences. Furthermore its
effects can be evaluated subjectively, along with the other
elements of the problem that were not treated by the quan-
titative analysis.
19. Peter C. Fishburn, "Methods of Estimating Additive
Utilities", Management Science Vol. 13, No. 7, March 1967,
p. 436.
20. Fishburn, Utility Theory for Decision Making, p. 43.
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The form of the additive utility model which will be
employed in this paper is a weighted additive value function ;
U(q) = U
1 (q ]_) + U 2 (q2 ) + . . . + Um (qj
= W1U1 (q]L ) + w2u 2 (q2 ) + . . . + wmum (qm ) (3)
where w. is the "weight" or relative importance assigned to
outcome dimension j. Each w. will be derived in a way that
reflects the relationship of its corresponding objective
(q ., ) to the broader goals that motivate policy. First,
however, construction of the component value functions u.
will be discussed.
21 '
The functions u. provide an interval measure of the
value, denoted u
.
(q . ) , of a particular consequence q., relative
to all other consequences in the same dimension. Since this
is a relative value measure it can be expressed on any scale.
The interval [0,1] will be used for measuring relative values.
Thus u. associates with each real consequence q. a number
between and 1. Higher numbers represent more desirable
consequences, and the ratio of the value of any two conse-
quences indicates how much more desirable one consequence is
than the other. The endpoints of the interval are defined
as follows:
u
-(q-u 4.) = 1 i and u . (q . ,) =
•} '^jbest ' j ^jworst
where q., and q. are as defined in Chapter II.
^jbest ^worst r
21. In an interval value measure the scale and origin of the
measure may be varied without changing the relative lengths
of intervals. In other words, consequence values are unique
up to a linear transformation.
35

Component value functions may have either discrete or
continuous domains. When the domain of u . is continuous,
the function can be represented by a graph (called a "worth
22
curve" by Pardee, et al. ). In the illustration below sup-
pose dimension j = "balance of payments with country X in
next fiscal year". Then the worth curve for the various
possible balance of payments consequences might look like
this:
q . ($ million)
-200 -100 +100 +200 +300
The above curve can be interpreted as follows: a balance
of payments deficit with country X of more than $200 million
is considered unacceptable, a surplus of more than $300
million is considered unlikely under any circumstances, and
the value of reducing the deficit by each additional million
dollars is roughly constant.
The slope of a worth curve at any point, denoted du./dq-,
is the marginal value of a small change along the consequence
dimension. While a worth curve need not be a straight line,
it will be assumed later for computational convenience and
22. Pardee et al., Measurement and Evaluation of Transport -
ation System Effectiveness, p. 161.
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conceptual simplicity that the worth curves are linear (i.e.,
that du./clq. is constant). This assumption means that the
curve is a straight line and is completely specified by its
endpoints
.
If it is not desired to assume linear worth curves, one
possible way of deriving the component value functions would
be the following:
(1) In each dimension j all conceivable consequences
(i.e., all conceivable values of q
.
) are listed.
(2) From this list the bounding consequences q., ,
and q. are identified,
^jworst
(3) The resulting list is submitted to a panel of
experts, who are asked to rank the consequences
between q. and q., in order of their
^jworst ^jbest
desirability.
(4) After the experts have rank-ordered the consequences,
they are asked to assign each consequence a number
between and 1, keeping in mind the following:
(a) The larger the number the more desirable the
consequence
.
(b) The ratio between the values assigned to any
two consequences is indicative of the relative
extent to which one is desired over the other.
1 2









1 2then q . is twice as desirable as q . .
(5) The above procedure is repeated for each dimension j.
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(6) Finally, the scores of the experts are averaged to
yield a composite value u






) is a measure of the extent to which the ob-
3 3
jective in that dimension is satisfied by consequence q..




) = 0.5 for some q., then q., for
' j ^-j ^-j ^jbest
that dimension is said to be "50% satisfied" (since U.(q., .)
3 ^jbest






henceforth be called the "satisfaction level" (SL) of ob-




) = x. for notational
simplicity.
C. THE HIERARCHY OF AIMS
Derivation of the weights, w., in (3) is founded upon
the concept of a hierarchy of aims . A hypothetical hierarchy
of aims is portrayed in Figure 1 . Each box in the figure
represents a particular aim (interest, goal, or objective)
,
labelled by a capital letter. In this example the X. are
objectives; Y,
, Y~, and Y~ are the goals which the objectives
are intended to pursue; and Z is an idealized goal, such as
"military worth" or "national welfare", which serves as the
ultimate measure of value in the given context. In general
a hierarchy will contain as many levels and as many aims as
are considered necessary to describe the relationship between





A hierarchy of aims of this type cannot be derived or
verified objectively . There exist no scientifically verifiable
functional relationships between the objectives at the bottom
of the hierarchy and the goals above them because the latter
are abstract notions. Examples of such abstract goals are
"national security", "economic prosperity", and "maintenance
of national prestige". A goal hierarchy is essentially "a
24pictorial map of the structure of worth relationships"
residing within the minds of policymakers. Hence it is in-
herently subjective in nature. Nevertheless it offers a way
in which nebulous goals that represent the "true" aims of
foreign policy can be used systematically and consistently
to motivate specific policies, and it makes explicit how they
are so used.
23. Another kind of hierarchy consisting solely of well-
defined objectives linked by causal relationships could also
be constructed. This hierarchy would be objectively derivable
and would serve the function of a predictive model, predicting
higher-order from lower-order consequences.
24. Pardee et al
.
, Measurement and Evaluation of Transportation
System Effectiveness, p. 31.
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A variable called the satisfaction level (SL) has already
been associated with each objective. Similarly a goal satis-
faction level can be associated with each goal in Figure 1.
Satisfaction levels are denoted by a lower-case letter. For
instance, z represents the SL of goal Z, or the extent to
which goal Z is fulfilled by a particular alternative.
The SL of a goal, like that of an objective, is expressed
on the interval [0,1]. The SL of a goal or interest is
computed, in the manner described below, as a function of
the SLs of the objectives contributing to it.
The arrows, and hence the vertical dimension, in Figure
1 represent a relationship of lower to higher aims that is
contributory. In other words, the achievement or level of
satisfaction of a lower aim has some bearing on the achieve-
ment or level of satisfaction of the higher aims with which
it is linked by an arrow. The exact nature of this contribu-





ujvk* U j' .Z. w . . = 1 (4)3=1 J J 3=1 ujvk
where
£ w , £ 1 for every j , kujvk J J '
v, is the SL of aim V,
u. is the SL of aim U.
D D
w . , is the marginal effectiveness or "weight"
assigned to aim U. in contributing to V
.
,
relative to all other U-level aims that-^
contribute to V . . If no relationship exists
between two aims, then w = 0.
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J is the number of aims at the U level
For goal Y, in Figure 1, equation (4) would become:
5 5
*1 j =1 xjyl 3
I w . vl = 1
j-1 X:,yl
(5)
Figure 2 is a reproduction of the original hierarchy with SLs
and weights assigned in the appropriate places for illustration
*1
= w
xlyl- x l + wx2yl' x 2
*2 = wx2y2' x 2 + wx3y2' x 3 + wx4y2* X 4
^3
= w




ylzl- y l +
W
Y 2 2 l-y2
+ wy3zl' y 3
Figure 2
The assumptions implicit in the foregoing model of goal/
objective interrelationships are:
(1) The SL of a parent aim is a deterministic linear
function of the SLs of its subordinate aims.
(2) The subordinate aims of a goal are substitutes for
one another. The SLs of two sub-aims can be traded
off at the ratio of their coefficient weights without
changing the SL of the parent aims.
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(3) No aim has a negative marginal effectiveness relative
to any higher aims
.
(4) All of the aims at each level of the hierarchy are
compatible but independent. Any or all of them can
be pursued simultaneously without influencing the
accomplishment of the others.
(5) The SL of a parent aim is maximized only when all
contributing sub-aims have maximum SLs.
The weights of the form appearing in equation (4) must
be specified subjectively by a panel of experts in a manner
similar to that described for the derivation of worth curves
in the preceding section. Since the weights measure only
relative marginal effectiveness, they can be expressed on an
interval scale of arbitrary length and origin. In this
analysis it is assumed that all weights are numbers between
and 1, and furthermore that the weights of all sub-aims
which contribute to a given aim sum to one.
D. DERIVING FINAL WEIGHTS FOR THE ADDITIVE VALUE FUNCTION
Value function (3) is of the form
U(q) = „ w.u.(q.) = „ w.x.
In this function w. is the marginal contribution of objective
X., relative to all other objectives, to the ultimate aim of
the hierarchy. This is termed the "final" weight of objective
X.. The weights appearing in equation (4) are "intermediate
weights", which express the marginal contribution of an
objective to an aim in the next higher level of the hierarchy,
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and are relative only to the other objectives serving that
aim. An objective or goal has as many intermediate weights
as there are aims at the next level, though some of these may
be zero. In Figure 1, for example, objective X, has three
intermediate weights (w , , , w , ~, and w , _) because there
^ xlyl xly2' xly3
are three Y-level goals, but only w , , is non-zero.
The final weight of an objective is a function of its
intermediate weights and the intermediate weights of all
goals that it serves in higher levels of the hierarchy. In
Figure 2, the final weight of the jth objective, w .





all values of k. The derivation of the final weight for
objective X. is as follows:
3





















P w . , . w ,
kI x ^Dyk ykzp
(6)
(7)
In this case, (3) now becomes:
U(q) v w .
.£, xnzp3=1 J p
(8)
It can easily be shown by extending this development
that the SL of the ultimate aim in any multi-level hierarchy
43

can be written as a weighted sum of the SLs of the objectives
at the bottom of the hierarchy. Furthermore, the SL of an
aim at any level of a hierarchy can be expressed in a similar
fashion as a weighted sum of the SLs of all aims in any sub-
ordinate level.
The intermediate weights of all subordinate aims contrib-
uting to a particular parent aim were assumed to sum to one.
It can now be shown that this relationship remains true for








\El Z w . , . w ,









xjyk . (1) = 1 from (4)
E. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the manner in which a hierarchy of
aims is used to generate the final weights required in the
additive value function, the following hypothetical example





Consider the problem faced by a fictitious set of U.S.
policymakers in planning a security assistance program for
a small ally. The following qoals and objectives are assumed
(refer to Figure 3)
:
Z = "provide defensive capability for country X
adequate to meet expected threats during the
planning period"
Y, = counter-insurgency capability
Y~ = Defensive capability against conventional ground
attack
Y~ = capability to protect coastal shipping from
naval interdiction
X, = expand militia forces by 200,000 men
X~ = expand standing army by 100,000 men with pro-
portionate increases in equipment and training
X_ = form two armored divisions and equip with U.S.
tanks
X. = re-equip five attack squadrons with U.S. aircraft
X c = double the number of coastal defense vessels
in commission
It is assumed that interrogation of the policymakers has




w , , = 0.5 w „ -, = 0.2
xlyl x4y3
w ~ , = 0.5 w c .= 0.8x2yl x5y3
w ~ = 0.
3
w , , = 0.
7
x2y2 ylzl
w . = .
5
w , = 0.
2
x3y2 y2zl
w - _ = 0.2 w - , = 0.1
x4y2 y3xl
These weights imply, for example, that upgrading conven-
tional ground forces and militia forces are equally important
in providing an adequate counter-insurgency capability. They
alst) imply that a counter-insurgency capability is considered
much more important to overall security than defense against
ground or naval attacks.
From the foregoing assumptions the final weights for




































= ° ( ' 7) + 0( * 2) + ' 8( ' 1) = -° 8 = W5
Observe that, as required, the final weights sum to 1.0.
It can be seen from these computations that the militia
and standing army expansion objectives are considerably more
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important to overall security than the other three. This
effect follows from the predominant importance of the counter-
insurgency goal in the hierarchy.
The final weights derived above could now be employed
in a weighted additive value function to measure the value












5 (q 5 )
.35x, + .41x + .lOx-, + .06x. +12 3 4
.08x c
_>
where x. is the satisfaction level of objective X. that cor-
D 3
responds to outcome q .
.
The relative desirability of any two vectors of objective




and x = (0.5,0.6,0.8,0.8,0.9)
correspond to outcomes q and q respectively. (These out-
-*-l -*2
comes in turn correspond to alternatives a and a ) . Then
U(q 1 ) = .35(.7) + .41(.5) + .10(.4) + .06(.6) + .08(.5)
= .245 + .205 + .040 + .036 + .040
= .566
and U(q 2 ) = .35(.5) + .41(.6) + .10(.8) + .06(.8) + .08(.9)




Thus the quantitative analysis suggests that outcome q is
slightly preferred to q . However, additional factors not
quantified in the analysis may have to be weighed subjectively
by the responsible decisionmaker.
F . SUMMARY
The procedure presented above for assessing the relative
value of outcomes may be summarized as follows:
(1) Each outcome (q) is transformed into a vector of
objective satisfaction levels (x) using the sub-
jectively-derived component value functions u
. (q . ) =
x . .
1
(2) A hierarchy of aims is subjectively constructed,
thus defining the goals and interests which all
objectives under consideration are intended to
serve. The relationship between aims at successive
levels in the hierarchy is assumed to be given by
equation (4) . The hierarchy is then used, in the
manner described by equation (7) , to compute the
final weight for each objective.
(3) The value of each outcome is then computed using
the results of the two preceding steps in the
weighted additive value function (3)
.
Subjective judgments provide inputs to the value function
in two ways: first, in assigning subjectively-derived satis-
faction levels to the objectives; and second, in deriving
the weights assigned to each objective. One advantage of
the additive value function is that it greatly simplifies
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value measurement through its assumption that objective SLs
can be evaluated independently of one another. Nevertheless,
this advantage would be lost if the final weights could only
be assigned on the basis of a simultaneous comparison of
most or all of the objectives. Therefore the usefulness of
a weighted additive value measure in reducing the complexity
of policy analysis depends partly on the assumption that,
at any, level in the hierarchy, each aim is served by only a
few aims in the next lower level. At the objectives level,
this means that fairly small (but possibly overlapping)
subsets of objectives can be identified, each of which con-
tributes to a different goal. If there are many goals at
the next level, they in turn can be divided into small
subsets with different aims, and so forth. If these require-
ments are met, then the intermediate weights in equation (4)
can be assigned subjectively without too much difficulty.
From these the final weights can be computed as shown in
equation (7)
.
In Figure 2 the largest number of dimensions a decision-
maker would have to consider in assigning the intermediate
weights is three, because no more than three sub-aims con-
tribute to any one aim. On the other hand, if he had to
evaluate the relative effectiveness of all of the objectives
directly (i.e., assign the final weights directly), he would
need to consider five dimensions simultaneously. In real-
world policy analysis, of course, the outcome vector normally
has many more dimensions than five.
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V. A QUANTITATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
A. CONSTRUCTING AN OPTIMAL SET OF ACTIVITIES FOR A GIVEN
BUDGET
In this section the evaluative model U developed in
Chapter III and the appropriate predictive model F will be
integrated into a quantitative policy analysis methodology.
The methodology will be capable of evaluating the relative
desirability of proposed alternatives and of constructing,
from a given set of component activities, the most preferred
alternative that does not exceed an assumed budget.
The essential components of the methodology have already
been developed: a value function U which assesses the rel-
ative value, U(q), of each outcome q; a predictor F which
relates each alternative a to a unique q = F(a); and a cost
function C that measures the dollar cost C(a) of each a.
It is desired to compare alternatives on the basis of
their relative "effectiveness." The effectiveness, E(a)
,
of an alternative a is defined as the relative value of the
outcome q which is predicted to result from the alternative .
Thus:
E(a) = U(5) = U[F(a)] (9)
Recall that an alternative a = (a,,..., a ) is defined byIn
specifying the level of operation, a., of each component
activity i. It is desired to find, from among all such
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vectors a whose cost does not exceed a given budget B, the
one which has the greatest effectiveness. Hence the problem
can be stated as:
Maximize E(a)
Subject to C(a) 1 B (10)
Two assumptions will now be made to simplify this prob-
lem and facilitate its solution. First it is assumed that
each component activity i can be operated at only one non-
zero level. This assumption implies no loss of generality
for some activities (e.g., diplomatic courses of action that
must be either adopted or rejected) . For other activities
with variable levels of operation (e.g., economic and military
assistance programs wherein the amount of assistance can be
varied) , an appropriate level should be selected for use in
the analysis. Subsequent analysis can be performed to test
the effect of using a different level of operation for such
activities. This assumption simplifies the problem by re-
ducing the number of alternatives under consideration. It
can be expressed mathematically as follows:
(0 if activity i not included
in a
1 if activity i is included in a
->-
Thus every a is a vector of zeroes and ones. For instance,
a = (0,1,1,0,0) is the alternative that includes only activ-
ities two and three from a set of five proposed activities.




/-Subject to C(a) tz. B
a. = or 1 for every i
The second simplifying assumption is that each of the
functions F, C, and u. (j = 1, ... r m) is a linear function.
A linear function has the following property:
-> -* ->-->-
G (o(x + y) = c(G(x) + G(y) , where 0( is a constant.
The assumption that F and C are linear implies that the
consequences and cost of each activity i can be evaluated
without reference to the level of operation of the other
activities. The linearity of u. implies that each worth
curve, which transforms consequences into an abstract value
measure, is a straight line.
The purpose of the linearity assumption is to guarantee
that both the objective function E(a) and the constraint
equation C(a) ^ B in (10) are linear. This will permit the
problem to be solved by integer programming. It will now




"I +2 r ">1 ">2 ,
E(aa + a ) = U[F(aa + a )] by def. of E
= U[aF(a ) + F(a )] by linearity of F
by def. of q
->1 ->2









+ q.^ + . . .
1 2





1 (q 1 )
+ u, (q,)J + . . .
1 2
+ w [au ( ) + u (q ) 1 by linearity of u.mmm mm j





+ w,u, q, + ... + w u (q )111 mmm
= aUCq 1 ) + U(q 2 )
->1
-*-2 ->1 ->2
E(aa + a ) = aE(a ) + E(a )
by def. of U
by def. of E
Thus E(a) has been shown to be a linear function.
One further observation will permit the objective function
and constraint in (10) to be written in a simpler form. Any
alternative a can be written as follows:
a =
n
+ . . . + a
n
= a,e, + . . + a e
n n
where e. is the unit vector is the "ith" direction.
Usina this result and the linearity of E, E(a) can be
rewritten as:
E(a) = E(a,e.. + . . . + a e ) = a,E(e,) .+ . . . + a E(a )11 n n 11 n n
Similarly, C(a) can be rewritten as
C(a) = a,C(e,) + . . . + a C(e
J
11 n n
Letting C(e.) = c. and E(e.) = e. for simplicity, the
problem can now be stated in its final form:
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Maximize e,a, + . . . + e a11 n n
Subject to c,a, + . . . + c a f= B ,,.,.J 11 n n (11)
a. = or 1 for every i
l J
The solution to this elementary integer programming
problem is fairly intuitive: one computes the ef fectiveness-
to-cost ratio e./c. for each resource-intensive activity i
and ranks the activities according to these ratios. The
activities are then selected one at a time, starting with
the most cost-effective (highest e./c), until the budget is
exhausted. Activities that have no resource costs (i.e.,
"diplomatic" activities) are formulated in mutually-exclusive
sets and the activity in each set with the highest e. is
chosen. The reader is referred to Appendix A for a detailed
solution to (11)
.
The aim of this chapter to integrate the results of
Chapters III and IV in a quantitative methodology has now
been accomplished. In the concluding section of the chapter
means will be examined of making the basic methodology more
flexible.
B. MODELLING INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG ACTIVITIES
Heretofore it has been assumed that the component activ-
ities are independent in the sense that the consequences of
one activity can be predicted without regard to the level of
operation of the other activities. In reality the following
interrelationships among activities might exist:
(1) Two activities are said to be complementary if their
effectiveness when operated jointly is greater than the sum
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of their individual effectiveness. More formally, activities
i and j are complementary if, and only if, E (e . + e.) > E(e.)
+ E(e.) . For example, in the improvement of educational
opportunity two activities that might be considered are
training better teachers and building better schools. These
activities are complementary because a teacher is influenced
by working conditions as well as the students, and thus is
likely to teach more effectively in a modern, well-equipped
school
.
(2) Two activities are said to be counterproductive if
their effectiveness when operated jointly is less than the
sum of their individual effectiveness. More formally, activ-
ities i and j are counterproductive if, and only if, E(e. + e.)
< E(e.) + E(e.) . For example, simultaneous attempts to
persuade and pressure another government into taking a desired
action can often be less fruitful than either approach taken
individually.
(3) An activity is said to be contingent on another if it
can be chosen only if the other is chosen. When a. is allowed
to take on only values or 1, the contingency of i on j can
be expressed by the constraint: a. ^ a. . For instance,
the U.S. might wish to make the sale of arms to Greece con-
tingent upon approval of an equivalent sale to Turkey, lest
Turkish fears be aroused.
(4) Two or more activities are said to be mutually ex-
clusive when no alternative can include more than one of
them at a positive level. Clearly two activities which are
logically contradictory are mutually exclusive. If activity
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i is "recognize Cuban government" and activity j is "continue
suspension of diplomatic relations", these activities are
mutually exclusive because they cannot both be chosen. A
set of activities may also be mutually exclusive as a result
of constraints inherent in the context of the problem. For
example, while a defensive alliance between the U.S. and
either the Soviet Union or China would not be inconceivable
in certain circumstances, simultaneous alliances with both
of them obviously would be unlikely. VThen a. = or 1 for
every i, mutual exclusiveness can be expressed by the fol-
lowing constraint: Z a. 4z 1 , where I is a set of mutually
iel 1
exclusive activities.
Not all of the above interrelationships can be incorporated
into the policy analysis methodology in its final form. While
the complementary and counterproductive interactions are
compatible with the formulation of the general problem in
(10) , they violate the subsequent assumption that E is a
linear function. Hence formulation (11) and a linear pro-
gramming solution technique cannot be used when such inter-
actions exist. In this case the problem might be susceptible
to a non-linear programming solution. However contingent
and mutually exclusive relationships among activities can be
modelled by the linear constraints discussed in paragraphs
(3) and (4) above. Hence these additional constraints can
be added to formulation (12) and the problem remains soluble




VI. APPLICATION TO A HYPOTHETICAL POLICY ANALYSIS
In this chapter the quantitative policy analysis method-
ology developed in preceding chapters will be applied to a
hypothetical State Department Policy Analysis and Resource
Allocation (PARA) study on a fictitious country. In the
interest of brevity and clarity, however, the number of ob-
jectives and courses of action will be reduced considerably
in comparison with most actual PARAs
.
The purposes of a country PARA are to identify U.S.
interests and goals with respect to a foreign state; examine
their relationship to the country's environment; and to
recommend objectives, courses of action, and resource al-
locations for the coming fiscal year.
A. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
1. Background Briefing - Asianon
"Asianon" is a developing East Asian nation of mod-
erate size. A former colonial possession of Great Britain,
she has since the withdrawal of Britain from the Far East
turned increasingly to the United States for economic and
technical assistance for her development. While Asianon is
eager for U.S. help in modernizing her armed forces as well,
she has steadfastly followed a neutral foreign policy since
achieving independence and is expected to continue on this
course for the foreseeable future. Recently Asianon spokes-
men have shown a desire to reemphasize their independence
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from the American government and its policies, largely in
response to a resurgent nationalism among intellectuals and
factions of the military.
Asianon's size, population, mineral wealth, and
location adjacent to the strategic Malunda Straits make her
a potentially strong economic and military power in the
region. However, many serious problems present obstacles
to the realization of this potential. The country's mining
industry is extremely inefficient due to antiquated equipment
and the lack of expertise. Inadequate public schooling, due
largely to a dearth of trained teachers, has resulted in a
very low literacy rate and a scarcity of talent for economic
and social development tasks. The military, which could play
an important development role in the country, also suffers from
a lack of trained manpower. Present military force levels
are considered inadequate to meet the modest external threat
of a neighbor or a determined insurgency.
2 . U.S. Interests and Goals vis-a-vis Asianon
a. Security Interests
Asianon is considered important to U.S. national
security for several reasons. First, realization of Asianon's
potential self-defense capability would discourage possible
aggressors and insurgencies, thereby enhancing the stability
of the region. The growth of Asianon's economic power,
coupled with her neutralist foreign policy, would also exert
a stabilizing influence in the region. In this regard, it is
important to maintain among Asianon leaders a favorable dis-
position toward the United States so that Asianon's growing
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power will not be used to the detriment of American interests.
Finally, the United States has a very strong interest in
retaining unrestricted right of passage through and over the
Malunda Straits. In the near future Asianon is expected to
extend her claim of territorial waters out to twelve miles
from her coasts. This claim would place the Malunda Straits
in Asianon territorial waters. Furthermore, there are clear
indications that, as a means of demonstrating her independence
from the United States, Asianon may decide not to acknowledge
an international right of unrestricted passage through and
over the Straits. Should this occur U.S. vessels would pos-
sess only the dubious right of "innocent" passage and sub-
merged submarines would be prohibited from transiting the
Strait. Failure of the United States to retain the right
of unrestricted passage through the Malunda Straits would
jeopardize American security interests in the Western Pacific
by potentially limiting the freedom of movement of U.S. naval
forces
.
In summary, U.S. security goals in Asianon for
the next few years are:
(1) Develop in Asianon a self-defense capability
strong enough to meet expected threats, but not so strong as
to alarm her neighbors.
(2) Accelerate the economic and social develop-
ment of the country.
(3) Cultivate in present and potential Asianon
leaders attitudes favorable toward the U.S. and a receptiveness
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to American policies and requests for cooperation.
(4) Maintain unrestricted U.S. access to all
strategic waters in the region, including the Malunda Straits,
b. Economic interests
U.S. economic interests in Asianon derive mainly
from her role as a source of non-strategic raw materials,
her potential as an important future market for American goods
and as a lucrative investment opportunity for the U.S. mining
and manufacturing industries. Development of the Asianon
economy and the maintenance of friendly relations between
Asianon and the U.S. would advance all of these interests.
Consequently U.S. economic goals in Asianon are as follows:
(1) Accelerate the economic and social development
of the country.
(2) Cultivate in present and potential Asianon
leaders attitudes favorable toward the U.S. and a receptive-
ness to American policies and requests for cooperation.
3. U.S. Objectives for the Next Fiscal Year
a. Train 10,000 additional para-military personnel
to supplement Asianon Army strength. These additional men
are badly needed to enhance defensive capabilities and to
participate in development programs.
b. Re-equip two Asianon Army airborne brigades with
U.S. weapons and equipment. Accomplishment of this objective
should contribute significantly to a credible Asianon de-
fensive capability against external threats.
c. Increase the productive capacity of the mining
industry by five percent. This improvement is recognized by
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Asianon leaders as absolutely essential to the further growth
of their economy. Its accomplishment through U.S. assistance
would be a significant factor in the maintenance of a continued
U.S. influence in Asianon policy.
d. Train one thousand additional teachers for the
Asianon public school system. While one thousand new teachers
will have only a modest impact on educational opportunity
in Asianon, this objective will help to demonstrate the
sincerity of the U.S. desire to help meet the country's social
needs
.
e. Obtain from the government of Asianon confirmation
of the right of unrestricted passage for American vessels and
aircraft through and over the Malunda Straits, regardless of
the territorial limit claimed by Asianon.
f. Avoid an open confrontation with the government
of Asianon over any potentially-emotional issue, such as
national/international rights in the Malunda Straits. Im-
portant as the Straits are to American security interests,
it is felt that an open split between the two governments
on this issue would do irreparable damage.
4 . Proposed Activities for the Next Fiscal Year
In order to accomplish the foregoing objectives,
the following activities have been proposed by the Country
Team and the Department's Country Director for Asianon, with
the concurrence of various functional bureaus and other
Federal agencies. In total cost the activities would exceed
any reasonably foreseeable budget allocation for the coming
fiscal year. It will be the task of subsequent analysis to
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select the most desirable collection of activities that can
be accomodated within expected budget constraints.
a. Para-military training
(1) Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant of
five million dollars making it possible for the Asianon Army
to train five thousand men.
(2) Use of U.S. military advisors to train an
additional five thousand men, at a total cost of four million
dollars
.
b. Airborne brigade re-equipment
(1) Furnish weapons and equipment costing the
MAP approximately five million dollars.
c. Mining productive capacity improvement
(1) Establish three new mining operations at the
sites of recently-discovered mineral deposits. This program,
to be conducted under the auspices of the Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID)
,
would cost about twenty million
dollars and would raise Asianon 's overall mineral productive
capacity by an estimated three percent.
(2) Furnish American technical advisors for
existing Asianon mines at a total cost of 12 million dollars.
(3) Contribute fifteen million dollars to the
United Nations Development Fund for technical assistance
programs in Asianon. It is roughly estimated that these last
two activities will each provide about a one percent improve-




(1) A proposed AID training program costing two
million dollars could provide five hundred new teachers.
(2) Another five hundred teachers could be trained
using Peace Corps volunteers. This would cost about five
million dollars.
e. Malunda Straits
Two alternative actions are under consideration
to resolve this problem. One is to inform the Asianon govern-
ment of the impossibility of obtaining U.S. Congressional
support for future military and economic assistance if
Asianon were to claim the Malunda Straits as territorial
waters without acknowledging an international right of free
passage. This action would probably evoke the desired
guarantee, but only at the cost of poisoning the currently
amicable relations of the two countries. The second alter-
native is to ignore the problem and hope for the best. It
is very likely that this course will result in an Asianon
claim to the Straits, subject only to the ambiguous right of
innocent passage for ships on the surface.
B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
This section will consist of a quantitative analysis of
U.S. policies vis-a-vis Asianon, utilizing the methodology
developed in the preceding chapters. The purpose of the
analysis will be to select the most effective mix of activities
that can be accomplished within assumed budget constraints.
In order to allow for uncertainties in the budgetary process,
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the optimal "alternative" (mix of activities) will be iden-
tified for allocations of ten, twenty-five, and fifty million
dollars for U.S. programs in Asianon.
1. Hierarchy of Aims vis-a-vis Asianon
Figure 4 portrays the interests, goals, and objectives
discussed in the qualitative analysis, and their interrelation-
ships. An arrow is drawn from each objective or goal to
every higher aim to which it contributes. The number ad-
jacent to each arrow is the intermediate weight associated
with the two aims. The intermediate weights are summarized
below.
w , , = 0.4 w , , = 0.2
xlyl ylzl
w ~ , = 0.6
x2yl
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(All intermediate weights not specifically listed are zero.)
2
. Component Value Functions
The worth curve in Figure 5 assign an objective satis-
faction level to each possible consequence of the proposed
activities. Since it was assumed earlier that the component
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Figure 5: Component Value Functions
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connectinq the values u . (q . .)= and u.(q., .)=!. These
J jworst j ^jbest
values, like the intermediate weights in the hierarchy of
aims, were obtained by interrogating the responsible
policymakers
.
3. Summary of Notation
(1) There are seven goals/interests in the hierarchy:
V (National Welfare)
Z, (U.S. Military Security)
Zp (U.S. Economic Prosperity)
Y, (Asianon self-defense capability)
Y~ (Economic/Social Development)
Y_ (Asianon leaders favorable to U.S.)
Y. (Unrestricted U.S. access to Malunda Straits)
(2) There are six objectives:
X, (Para-military training)
Xp (Army re-equipment)
X_ (Increase productive capacity)
X. (Teacher training)
X_ (Avoid confrontation on Straits issue)
X
fi
(Obtain guarantee of unrestricted passage in
Straits)
(3) There are ten proposed activities:
1 (MAP training grant)
2 (Training by U.S. advisors)
3 (MAP re-equipment program)
4 (AID construction program)
5 (AID advisory program)
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6 (UNDP technical assistance grant)
7 (AID teacher training program)
8 (Peace Corps teacher training)
9 (Ignore potential problem over Straits access)
10 (Threaten cutoff of future assistance)
(4) An alternative is a vector of activity levels:
a = (a, , 3.^ i 3-5 / a . , a_ , a_ , a_ , a», ag , a, ~.
)
a . = or 1 for all i
An outcome is a vector of consequences:
q = (q X f q 2 ' c2 3 '
c34' c35' c3 6 )
An outcome can be transformed to a vector of
objective satisfaction levels using the component value
functions u
. (q . ) = x. (the satisfaction level of objective
->
X — \X-|,X„ / X_ / X. f X|-/X,j
- x. - 1 for all j
3
4 . Prediction of Consequences
Based upon the information contained in the qualitative
analysis, consequences of the proposed activities may be pre-
->
dieted. Let e. be the alternative that includes only the ith
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Using the worth curves derived above, each outcome
can be converted to a vector of objective satisfaction levels




= (.5,0,0,0,0,0) x2 = (.5,0,0,0,0,0)
x
3
= (0,1.0,0,0,0,0) x 4 = (0,0, .6,0,0,0)
x = (0,0, .2,0, 0,0) x° = (0,0, .2,0,0,0)
x
7
= (0,0,0, .5,0,0) X 8 = (0,0,0, .5,0,0)
x
9
= (0,0,0,0,1.0,0) x10= (0,0,0,0,0,1.0)
5 . Derivation of Final Weight for Each Objective
The final weights are computed using the intermediate
weights from Figure 4 in equation (7) of Chapter IV. Only
representative calculations will be presented here. De-




xlzl xlyl ylzl xly2 y2zl xly3 y3zl xly4 y4zl
= ,4(.2)+ .3(.l) + 0(.3) + 0(.4) = 0.11
Summary:
w , , = 0.11 w , = 0.12
xlzl xlz2
w « , = 0.12 w ~ ~ =
x2zl x2z2
w , = 0.12 w = 0.36
x3zl x3z2
w „ , = 0.07 w . ~ = 0.16
x4zl x4z2
w c , = 0.18 w c ~ = 0.36x5zl x5z2
w a , = 0.40 w c =x6zl x6z2
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Using the final weights in equation (3) of Chapter IV, the
weighted additive value function for this problem can now
be written:
6
U(q) = E w.u (q )
j=l D -1 J
.113x, + .084x o + .192x- + .097x. + .234x r + 280x,1 Z i 4 5 6
6 . Computation of Activity Effectiveness Coefficients
Individual activity effectiveness coefficients for
use in formulation (11) of Chapter V can now be computed,
using the additive value function and the outcomes listed in











= .113x3- + .084xi + ,192x* + .097x1 + .234x^ + .280x3:12 3 4 5 6
= .113(.5) + .084(0) + .192(0) + .097(0) + .234(0) +
.280(0)
= .0565
Summary of Effectiveness Coefficients:
e. = .0565 (Military training e
?
=.0565 (Military training
under MAP) by U.S. advisors)




= .0384 (AID technical advisors) e
fi
= .0384 (UNDP grant)
e = .0485 (AID teacher training) e
R






= .2340 (Ignore Straits e10= - 2800 (threaten cutoffproblem) of assistance)
7
.
Mathematical Formulation of Problem
The problem can now be formulated in the format of
(11) in Chapter V. The cost coefficients are taken from the
cost information in the qualitative analysis. Two kinds of
mathematical constraints on the problem exist. One is a
budget constraint, which requires that the total cost of all
the activities chosen in the optimal alternative must not
exceed the given budget. This constraint can be written as:
10
E c.a. — B. The second is a logical constraint: activities
i=l x 1
9 and 10 are mutually exclusive, since they obviously cannot
both be included in the same alternative. This constraint





The final formulation is as follows:
Maximize .0565a, + .0565a~ + .0840a^+ .1152a. + .0384a,-
1 Z. J 4 D
+ .0384a. + .0485a_ + .0485a o + .2340a o + . 2800a, n6 7 8 y 10




a. = or 1 for all i
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The effectiveness/cost ratio for each activity





-0565/5 = .0113 e
2
/c 2 = - 0141





.0032 e6^c 6 = - 0025
e /c
7
= .0248 e 8^c 8 = * 0097
This ratio is not defined for activities 9 and 10, since
c
9
= c 1Q = 0.
b. Allocation of Resources
Budget money is allocated to the activities in
the order of their effectiveness/cost ratios, starting with
the highest, until the budget has been exhausted.
Activity e
.
/c . Cost Running Cost Total
($ millions)
7 (AID teacher .0248 2 2
training)
3 (Army re-equipment) .0168 5 7
$10 million
2 (Military training .0141 4 11
by U.S. advisors)
1 (Military training .0113 5 16
under MAP)
8 (Peace Corps teacher .0097 5 21
training) $25 million
4 (AID construction) .0058 20 41
$50 million
5 (AID technical .0032 12 53
advisors)
6 (UNDP grant) .0026 15 66
If the Asianon country program is budgeted at
$10 million, the optimal alternative includes only activities
3 and 7; for a $25 million budget activities 1, 2, and 8 can
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be added; and for a $50 million budget, activity 4 can also
be adopted. If desired, the proposed activities can now
be modified and the analysis repeated. For example it might
be desired to adjust the scale and costs of activities 2,
3, and 7 so that all three of them can be fitted within a
$10 million budget.
c. Selection of Preferred Diplomatic Action
In accordance with the solution technique con-
tained in Appendix A, the diplomatic action with the highest





= .2800, the quantitative analysis indicates
that activity 10 (threaten cutoff of assistance to obtain
guarantee of unrestricted free passage in Malunda Straits)
is preferred to activity 9
.
d. Summary of Optimal Solutions
-*->
->
Let a? , a*. ,, and a*. . be the optimal alter-low mid high r
natives for the $10, $25, and $50 million budgets respectively
Then:
(1) a* = (0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1). This alter-
native includes the preferred diplomatic measure (activity
10 - threaten cutoff of assistance) , and the $10 million
budget is distributed between activities 3 (Army re-equipment)
and 7 (AID teacher training)
.
(2) a* = (1,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,1). Activities
mid
1 (military training under MAP), 2 (military training by U.S.
advisors) , and 8 (Peace Corps teacher training) are added to






= (1,1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,1). Activity 4
(AID construction) is added to the programs included in a* . ,
.
r mid
These solutions are "optimal" only for the
proposed activities as originally formulated, and only on
the basis of the factors explicitly included in the quantita-
tive analysis. A re-definition of activities could lead to
different solutions. In addition, the subjective incorpo-
ration of additional factors into the analysis might generate
other solutions which may be preferable.
9 . Concluding the Analysis
To complete the quantitative analysis of this problem,
the optimal solutions should be recomputed using different
values for some of the goal weights and assuming different
consequences for activities with uncertain outcomes. The
results of such sensitivity analyses should indicate the as-
sumptions about goal weights and consequences to which the
optimal solutions are most sensitive. These assumptions
could then be subjected to closer judgmental scrutiny. In
addition, solutions that are optimal or near-optimal for a
wide variety of assumptions can also be identified.
The final results of the quantitative analysis would
comprise only one part of a thorough policy analysis of the
hypothetical problem. The quantitative results should be
interpreted subjectively by experienced policymakers and
modified as necessary in the light of other factors (such
as other-country effects of certain activities and the effect




VII. EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this concluding chapter two analytical extensions of
the proposed quantitative policy analysis methodology are
discussed. The modifications increase the flexibility of the
methodology and render it more suitable for the State Depart-
ment's Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) process
Lastly, some of the virtues and defects of the quantitative
methodology are summarized and an overall assessment offered
of its merits and utility for PARA.
A. EXTENSIONS TO THE METHODOLOGY
1 . A Dynamic Model
In the methodology described in preceding chapters,
the selection of activities for each fiscal year was treated
as a decision problem independent of earlier country programs
and anticipated future objectives. In reality a PARA must
be designed to build upon previous accomplishments, to lay
the groundwork for future activities, and to keep options
open. The objectives in a given year are desired not only
for the immediate benefits which they generate, but also for
their contributions to anticipated future objectives. Simi-
larly, activities pursued in a given year may have conse-
quences in several future years. In short policy analysis
is a dynamic process. The time considerations which were
incorporated subjectively in the original methodology could
be treated explicitly in a policy analysis methodology based
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upon a dynamic predictive model and an evaluative model that
includes time preferences for consequences.
One possible approach to a dynamic methodology would
be the following: assume a multi-year planning period of T
->t ->tyears, with alternatives a and outcomes q defined for each
year t (t = 1, ...,T). A sequence of alternatives a = (a , a
,
...,a ) is called a "strategy" and the corresponding se-
quence of outcomes q = (q ,q ,...,q ) an "outcome stream".
A relative value function U is defined over outcome streams,
->1
-*t ->t
so that U(q , ...,q ) is the present value of realizing q in
year t, for t = 1,...,T. The outcome achieved in a given
year t would in general be a function of the state of affairs
at the beginning of the year (i.e., the outcome of the previous
year's activities) and the alternative adopted for t. Kence,
->t -»-t -*t-l




-»-TFind a to maximize U(q ,...,q )
Subject to c(a fc ) ^ Bt for all t
->t -*-t ->t-l
q = F(a ,q ) for all t
where B is the budget constraint anticipated in year t.
One could now proceed in the manner of Chapter V to make
assumptions about the form of U and F and to develop a solu-
tion algorithm using the principles of dynamic programming.
The explicit treatment of time considerations in a
dynamic formulation would add flexibility to the policy




2. Extensions of Country-based Methodology to Regional and
Global PARAs
Regional and global policy analyses could be done in
either of two ways: by aggregating several country-level
PARAs / or by starting anew using the same approach as in the
country-level PARA. The first method has the advantage of
simplicity and is readily adaptable to decentralized policy-
making. The second method relates country objectives to
regional and global goals more explicitly.
In the ensuing discussion let there exist K countries,
->-k -*-k
each denoted by the index k = 1,...,K; let a and q be the
alternative and predicted outcome in the kth country in a
given year.
a. Regional/Global Analysis Method I
A unique hierarchy of aims, and hence a unique
relative value function U, , is defined for each country. In
addition, each country is assigned a weight w, representing
its relative importance to the overall national interest,
K




an aggregate vector of outcomes q = (q ,...,q ) is defined
as a weighted sum of the relative values for each country:
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The problem of selecting an optimal aggregate
*
-»-l ->K
alternative a = (a ,...,a ), assuming a fixed total budget B,
could be written as:
K
-**
Maximize S w. U, (q )
k=l K k
K
-k ySubject to E c(a ) ^= B
k=l
The solution to this problem would include the optimal dis-
tribution of funds between countries as well as among activ-
ities within each country. "Other-country" effects (con-
sequences relative to a country that proceed from activities
in another country) can also be modelled in this formulation




Method I for regional/global analysis may be
modified to permit its use in a decentralized, iterative
policymaking process. In this process each Country Team/
Country Director would have the responsibility of allocating
->khis budget B, so as to maximize U, (q ) . At each iteration
of the process, the central planners would decide upon a
budget distribution (B, ,...,B ) among the K countries such
that the sum of all B, was equal to B, the total regional
or global budget. Using these constraints, country teams
would solve the problem:
-kMaximize U, (q )
Subject to c(a ) =s B,
In solving this problem the marginal value to the country
program, dU*/dB, , of an additional increment of funds could
be determined. From this the marginal change in the
optimal value of the aggregate value function could be
computed:
dU d K dU*
= E w,U* = w,
dB
k dBk k=l
K K K dBk
The central planners would use this information to compute
a new budget distribution, giving more money to country
dUkprograms with high values of w, and less money to proqrams
dB
k
with low values. The optimal budget distribution among
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countries (i.e., the values of B 1/ ...,B that maximize U(q) )
dU*k 25
would result when all w, are equal .
dBkb. Regional/Global Analysis Method II
A new hierarchy of aims is defined which replaces
the individual hierarchies defined for each country. The
new hierarchy incorporates regional and global goals as well
as country-oriented goals. Thus it explicates the relation-
ship between the former and country-based goals and objectives
The new composite hierarchy generates a new relative value
function U which is defined over an aggregate vector of
outcomes:
U(gJ = iKq 1 ,.. .,q
K
)
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25. See Appendix C for proof of this assertion
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The problem of selecting an optimal aggregate alternative
a for a given budget could be written as:
-1
->kMaximize U (q , . . . ,q )
K ^kSubject to E c(a ) ~ B
k=l
B. CONCLUSIONS
1 . Advantages of Quantitative Methodology
The quantitative methodology proposed in this paper
offers the following advantages over traditional methods of
. .
... 26policy analysis:
(1) Goals, objectives, and their priorities are
explicitly stated.
(2) All of the relevant dimensions of the decision
are incorporated into the analysis. The human tendency to
concentrate on relatively few aspects of a complicated
decision at the expense of the others is avoided.
(3) The methodology is capable of handling finer
levels of discrimination in the importance of aims or the
effectiveness of activities than is possible with qualitative
analysis.
(4) The methodology provides a way of linking concrete
objectives and activities to the vaguely-defined goals of
foreign policy.
(5) If computerized the methodology would be capable
of examining quickly and easily many more alternatives than
26. This section draws in part on a paper by Mr. John K.
Wilhelm of the Department of State presented at the 25th




would ever be possible using traditional methods.
2 . Disadvantages of Quantitative Methodology
Disadvantages of the quantitative methodology are as
follows:
(1) The simplifications of reality that are necessary
to make the mathematics tractable, such as the assumption
that objectives are independent of one another, introduce
distortions into the analysis. These distortions must be
corrected by subjective, qualitative assessment of the
quantitative results.
(2) Quantification of some of the subjective factors
in the analysis, such as the weights to be assigned to mili-
tary security and economic prosperity, is a difficult judg-
mental task. In addition, policymakers feel an understandable
reluctance to discuss such politically-sensitive factors in
explicit, quantitative terms.
In conclusion, both qualitative and quantitative
methods of analysis possess unique advantages and disadvan-
tages. A well-designed policy analysis system should be a
blend of both techniques. The methodology proposed in this
thesis is offered in the hope that it will contribute to
the development of more systematic, quantitative techniques




SELECTION OF OPTIMAL ALTERNATIVE VECTOR OF ACTIVITY
LEVELS IN PROBLEM (11) OF CHAPTER V
The problem may be written in a more general form as
Maximize e,a n +...+e a +e ,,a ,,+... +e , ,a ,,11 n n n+1 n+1 n+d n+d
Subject to c.a,+...+c a ^:J 11 n n B
E a. = 1 for each set I of mutually-
I exclusive diplomatic activ-
ities
a. = or 1 for every i
where i=l,...,n are the subscripts of the resource-
intensive activities, and i=n+l, . .
.
, n+d are the sub-
scripts of the diplomatic courses of action, which
have no resource costs.
Since the objective function and constraints in the
above problem are separable, selection of preferred diplo-
matic activities can be treated separately from allocation
of resources.
1. Allocation of Resources
Find a,,..., a to maximize e,a,+...+e aIn 11 n n
Subject to c,a,+...+c a 4zJ 11 n n B
a. = or 1 for every i
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The general idea in solving this problem is to select
activities one at a time, in order of decreasing e./c. until
the total cost of all activities selected reaches B.
Let r be the index of activities ranked in order of
highest to lowest e./c.. Thus r=l corresponds to the
maximum e./c, r=2 to the next highest, and so forth. Re-
(
write the problem as:
n
Maximize E e a
i r rr=l
n y
Subject to E c a *: BJ
-. r r
r=l
a = or 1 for all r
r
Let S be the total cost of selecting all activities up
r





= 0. The following sequential algorithm can now be used
to solve the problem:
(1) Initialize r = 1, a. = for i = l,...,n
(2) Compute S = S _, + c
(3) If S
r
> B, go to (7)
If S = B, set a = 1 and go to (12)
If S < B, go to (4)
(4) Set a = 1 and r = r + 1
r
(5) If r = n + 1, go to (12)
(6) Go to (2)
(7) Set j = r + 1
(8) If j = n + 1, go to (12)




If S , + c. = B, set a. = 1 and go to (12)
r-1 j j r
If S , + c. > B, go to (11)
r-1 j ^
(10) Set a.=l f S , = S , + c .
j ' r-1 r-1 3
(11) Set j = j + 1 and go to (8)
(12) Stop
The output of this algorithm is a vector of activity
levels, (a,,..., a ), that yields the highest overall ef-
fectiveness without exceeding a total cost of B.
2. Selection of Preferred Diplomatic Activities
Let a ,,,..., a ,, be the activity levels of d activities
n+1 n+d J
that have no resource costs (i.e., diplomatic actions).
The problem is to:
Maximize e ,,a ,,+... +e ..a ,,
n+1 n+1 n+d n+d
Subject to E a. = 1 for each set I of mutually
I exclusive activities
a. = or 1 for i = n+1...., n+d
l
Diplomatic activities are always formulated in sets of
at least two mutually-exclusive activities, since any diplo-
matic action has at least one mutually-exclusive alternative
(namely, not to take the action)
.
The solution to this problem is straightforward. For
each set I of mutually-exclusive activities, find the one




For each I find i such that e. =. max S e . for all i e l(
1 j C 3 3
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In the hypothetical problem analyzed in Chapter VI, a Q
and a,
n
were mutually-exclusive diplomatic activities. Further-
more, e, Q was greater than e_. Hence the preferred solution
was a
g




SUPPLEMENTARY CALCULATIONS FOR CHAPTER VI
1. Derivation of Final Weight for Each Objective
The intermediate weights relating each level of aims to
the next highest level are given. It is desired to compute
the final weights, which relate the objectives (X-level aims)
to the ultimate goal V. The procedure is to compute new
intermediate weights relating the objectives to the Z-level
goals using equation (7) of Chapter IV, and then to use
these weights again in equation (7) to relate the objectives
to V.
a. Calculation of X-to-Z-level Intermediate Weights
From equation (7) developed in Chapter IV, the
computing formula is:
4
w . = £ w . ,w . for j—1.....5; p=l,2




' 4( * 2) + • 3 (- 1 ) + °(- 3 ) + 0(.4) = 0.11
w . = .6(.2) + 0(.l) + 0(.3) + 0(.4) = 0.12
w . . = 0(.2) + .6(.l) + .2(.3) + 0(.4) = 0.12
w
x4zl
= 0( ' 2) + -K-D + -2(.3) + 0(.4) = 0.07
w _
1
= 0(.2) + 0(.l) + .6(.3) + 0(.4) = 0.18
.A. J /j 1
w = 0(.2) + 0(.l) + 0(.3) +1.0(.4)= 0.40
vC O Za _L *
D
E w . . = 1.00
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W , n = .4(0) + .3(.4) + 0(.6) + 0(0) = 0.12xlz2
w 9 9 = .6(0) + 0(.4) + 0(.6) + 0(0) = 0.00
w -. 9 = 0(0) + ,6(.4) + .2(.6) + 0(0) = 0.36
w . 9 = 0(0) + .1(.4) + .2(.6) + 0(0) = 0.16
w - 9 = 0(0) + 0(.4) + .6(.6) + 0(0) = 0.36
w , 9 = 0(0) + 0(.4) + 0(.6) + 1.0(0)= 0.00
E w . = 1.00
3=1
b. Calculation of X-to-V-level Final Weights
w . = E w . w for p=1.2; r=l
xjvr _, xjzp zpvr r
=w.,w,,+w.~w„,
xjzl zlvl xjz2 z2vl




- 12( - 7) + 0( ' 3) = - 084 = w
2










18 (- 7 ) + -36(.3) = .234 = w5
w , , = .40(.7) + 0(.3) = .280 = w rx6vl r 66
I w . , =1.000
j=l x ^ vl
2. Calculation of Activity Effectiveness Coefficient
a. Summary of Objective SLs Resulting from Activities
x
1
= (.5,0,0,0,0,0) x 2 = (.5,0,0,0,0,0)
x
3
= (0,1.0,0,0,0,0) x 4 = (0,0, .6,0,0,0)
x
5
= (0,0, .2,0,0,0) x 6 = (0,0, .2,0,0,0)
x
7
= (0,0,0, .5,0,0) x 8 = (0,0,0, .5, 0,0)
x
9
= (0,0,0,0,1.0,0) x10= (0,0,0,0,0,1.0)
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b. Weighted Additive Value Function







c. Calculating Effectiveness Coefficients




























= U(5 8 ) = . 113(0)+. 084 (0) + . 192(0)+. 097(. 5) + . 234 (0) +
.280 (0) = .0485
e
9
= U(q 9 ) = . 113(0)+. 084 (0)+. 192(0)+. 097(0)+. 234 (1.0)+
.280(0)=. 2340
10e in





OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
AMONG COUNTRY PROGRAMS
1. Country planners allocate funds within their country-
programs so as to maximize the country-based value function.
In so doing they solve the following problem:
->k -*-kFind a to maximize U, (a )
Subject to c (a ) 4 B, (CI)
where the subscript/superscript k denotes the kth country
(k=l / . ..,K).
Let U£ be the optimal value of U, . This will be a function
of B, because in general a different budget will result in a
different allocation of resources and a higher or lower value
of U, . Hence,
uk = uk (V
2. Central planners allocate the total budget among the K
countries in order to maximize the aggregate value function.
They solve the problem:
K
Find B..
, . . .
,B to maximize Z w, U* (B, )
J. K ,_,KKK
K (C2)
Subject to £ B, = B
k=l K









= w, - X =0 (first order necessary condition
9B, 9B, for optimality)
9U*
hence X = w, for every k, which implies that the
k
9U*
quantities w, are all equal. In other words, theK
3B.k
9U*
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